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THE NEW TIME AND SPACE

Dimensions of a Maritime Defense Strategy

Tomohisa Takei

Your Majesty, King of Zhao, if you serve the King of Qin, he will ask to be given the castles of Yiyand and Cheng Gao. If you provide the castles this year, the King of Qin will then tell you to give him some land the next year. If you give away parcels of land, eventually the amount of land suitable for release will be reduced, and, if you do not provide land, then everything that you have done up until now will become useless, and eventually you will run into big trouble. . . . [W]ithout doing any battle, your land will be sliced away, continuously.

蘇秦列傳 [BIOGRAPHY OF SU QIN]

Compared with previous years, the Japanese defense white paper for fiscal year 2016 devoted more pages to discussing territorial disputes in the South China Sea—where China has been behaving with disrespect to international norms. The Chinese are overriding international law with Chinese civil law. China's activities, such as reclamation activities on submerged features, reefs, and rocks, have exacerbated longstanding territorial disputes among Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) members. International and regional attention has been drawn to the decision in favor of the Philippines versus China

by a tribunal constituted under Annex VII of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and held in the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) at The Hague.

In the Spratly Islands, China purports to build seven "islands" from reclaimed coral and sand.¹ It takes significant effort, time, and expense to build dry land from scratch by "reclaiming" it onto a reef. Even Subi Reef, the closest of these features to China, is located 510 nautical miles (approximately 950 kilometers) from Hainan Island. In disregard

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of generally accepted land-reclamation practices, the Chinese allow no time for the foundation to stabilize; instead they build multiple facilities right away and militarize the area. Just two years after starting reclamation activities at Fiery Cross Reef, for example, China announced the completion of a three-thousand-meter runway and peripheral facilities. China also conducted a test flight of a civilian airplane on January 2, 2016. By early 2017, facilities had been completed for twenty-four military aircraft on three reclaimed “islands”: Fiery Cross Reef, Mischief Reef, and Subi Reef. The Vietnamese government condemned this act as an infringement of sovereignty.² According to estimates based on similar projects in Japan, the costs to build an artificial island as big as the one on Fiery Cross Reef (2.74 square kilometers in area, five meters in height), pave a three-thousand-meter runway, and build an airport with all the necessary ancillary facilities (e.g., aircraft warning lights and guide lights) could be as high as U.S.\$2.4 billion (¥240 billion).³

China is executing six construction projects similar to the Fiery Cross Reef reclamation simultaneously, bringing several dredging boats and pump dredgers to expedite the effort. Many view this activity as an effort to gain territorial control of the South China Sea. Neighboring countries and the international community at large, including Japan and the United States, have pursued peaceful, legal resolutions of this issue, so far to no avail.⁴

From August 5 through August 9, 2016, while two to three hundred Chinese fishing boats were operating around the Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea, up to fifteen China Coast Guard (CCG) vessels entered and exited the contiguous zone repeatedly, and fifteen CCG vessels entered Japanese territorial waters (i.e., within twelve nautical miles of shore) during this short period.⁵ Considering the abnormal number of CCG vessels (three to four have been more common for such incursions) and their intrusion into territorial waters, the Japanese government made a diplomatic protest to the Chinese government. Suspicions arose that the activities of the many fishing boats and CCG vessels operating in the area surrounding the Senkaku Islands actually constituted an invasion being directed by the Chinese government, especially because after the most intrusive entry to date occurred on August 9 the invasion of territorial waters suddenly paused—abnormal behavior for ordinary fishermen.

Two issues emerged from these events in the South and East China Seas.

The first is that China has demonstrated that it has the resources to carry out multiple massive, expensive marine-construction projects simultaneously and quickly, and it seemingly disregards limitations imposed by UNCLOS and complaints from the international community. China’s one-party-rule political system makes it easy for the Chinese Communist Party to control and direct numerous fishing boats and deploy a large force of CCG vessels.

The second issue is that the land-reclamation activities in the Spratly Islands and the dispute over the Senkaku Islands both can be considered part of China's strategy to expand its maritime claims in the region. The nature of the country's political system, combined with the massive economic resources available to it, provides China with the flexibility needed to adjust the speed and scale with regard to time and space considerations for its territorial-expansionist maritime strategy. No other country in the Asia-Pacific region can match China in this regard. Consequently, every effort must be made to avoid "mirror imaging" China when analyzing the current security environment.

This article examines the concepts of time and space from the perspective of a status quo nation that seeks to deter the designs of a revisionist power, and helps formulate a new maritime self-defense strategy for Japan that serves as a useful reference for small and medium-sized countries that seek to preserve stability in their regions.

THE NEW SECURITY ENVIRONMENT: THE TIME DIMENSION

During the height of America's military intervention in Vietnam, from 1965 to 1968, the quantity and quality of the American military was so overpowering vis-à-vis the Vietcong, along with their North Vietnamese allies, that it seemed the United States could not lose the war. But, as Yōnosuke Nagai observed in his *Jikan no Seijigaku (Politics and Time)*, one must understand America's loss in terms of who lost to whom.

Conclusively speaking, it is a cruel historical fact that the metropolitan power, empowered through an urban industrial/technological society, lost to [the Vietcong], empowered through a primitive, agricultural society. This battle was not a *simplicistic battle of military "ability" but a battle of "will."* While the battle of "ability" is basically a spatial and quantitative battle, the battle of "will" is *determined by the system's stamina size, or the size of the sacrifice (cost) measured by time.*⁶

In other words, as the struggle became protracted, an increasingly war-weary American citizenry lost its will to fight. In contrast, the North Vietnamese, despite dramatic battlefield losses and the defeat of the Vietcong following the Tet Offensive, eventually prevailed because they never lost their will to fight, despite the passage of time.

Nagai also notes two asymmetries that generally (including in the Vietnam War) work to the advantage of a liberation army fighting against a government army: (1) The existence of sanctuaries helps the liberation army avoid defeat. (2) The liberation army—the revisionist force—takes the initiative against the government army—the status quo defenders.⁷ The Vietnam War was an asymmetrical battle between a metropolitan power, the United States, and a liberation army. The liberation army based itself in its sanctuary of North Vietnam,

supported by China and the Soviet Union, and used this advantage to carry out guerrilla war freely against South Vietnam. Over time, the liberation army took advantage of the two asymmetries, patiently continuing to fight in such a way as to avoid defeat. The war eventually exhausted the will of the metropolitan power to continue to fight. The liberation army skillfully used a “ripening-time” strategy—it waited until the time was ripe, then took decisive action.⁸

National liberation wars that follow such a ripening-time strategy, such as the Vietnam War and the Algerian War, continue to be fought today, such as in Afghanistan, Syria, and North Africa. However, in these modern conflicts we see a variation in the strategy in the form of indiscriminate terror attacks, such as those carried out by the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). Not only does ISIL send terrorists disguised as Middle Eastern refugees into Europe; it uses social media to promote its version of violent extremism, sending out propaganda and encouraging terrorism. Hundreds of thousands of refugees fleeing the Syrian civil war and Libya’s domestic disorder have flooded Europe. This phenomenon, accompanied by continuing terrorist acts, has made the member states of the European Union (EU) suspicious about refugees, which led to a fundamental shift in EU refugee policy. ISIL’s indiscriminate terror attacks are intended to demonstrate the organization’s power and to exhaust the national will of those opposed to it. In this context, ISIL’s indiscriminate terror attacks can be categorized as part of a ripening-time strategy.

Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea using “hybrid warfare” and its promotion of conflict in eastern Ukraine, like China’s one-sided land-reclamation activities in the South China Sea, exhibit characteristics of the ripening-time strategy.⁹ Russia’s military is overwhelmingly more powerful than Ukraine’s, and Russia has placed about forty thousand soldiers in the vicinity of the shared border. Ukraine cannot recapture Crimea, and because Russian public opinion strongly supports President Vladimir Putin’s foreign policy, Russia can maintain its efforts—fighting to avoid defeat—and wait until Ukraine loses its will to fight and concedes.¹⁰

With regard to the South China Sea, China has pursued a strategy similar to Russia’s in Crimea and eastern Ukraine. China’s land-reclamation activities, its construction of harbor and airport facilities, and its militarization of the entire body of water have ensured China’s actual control over the features under dispute. Now China waits for the international community to lose its will to contest Chinese actions.

On July 12, 2016, an Annex VII arbitration tribunal denied China’s claim to historic title within the area of the “nine-dash line” as being incompatible with UNCLOS. It further determined that the Spratly Islands consist only of mere rocks and low-tide elevations, rather than islands that can sustain human habitation; only the latter would have been entitled to an exclusive economic zone

(EEZ). Consequently, regardless of which state has lawful title to the features in the Spratly Islands, those features are entitled, at most, to a territorial sea; no feature generates an EEZ. Specifically, the court's ruling noted that four of the seven China-controlled "lands" were constructed on rocks; they accrue twelve nautical miles of territorial waters, but not an EEZ or an extended continental shelf. The other three features, Subi, Hugh (or Hughes), and Mischief Reefs, are low-tide elevations in that they are above water at low tide but submerged at high tide. These features are considered to be part of the seabed; no state may claim title over them. If they lie in the EEZ of a coastal state, that state does enjoy exclusive sovereign rights and jurisdiction over the living and nonliving resources of the features. However, almost half of the seven features in question are located within two hundred nautical miles of the Philippines, Brunei, and Malaysia, which dispute ownership with China, while the remaining features are located on the high seas, belonging to no country and falling within no country's EEZ.¹¹ Because EEZ borders in the South China Sea are not finalized, the several countries involved are left fighting over the "territory" of the Spratlys and many other small features, sometimes trying to seize control by force (even if on a small scale), through land reclamation, or both.

The seven features where China is reinforcing its control have been transformed from their original state, and CCG patrol vessels now block foreign vessels from the area. The number of ships in the People's Liberation Army Navy and the CCG continues to expand, now exceeding the totals of their counterparts in Vietnam, Malaysia, and the Philippines combined.¹² Numerous fishing boats assigned to the People's Armed Forces Maritime Militia further skew the odds against China's regional neighbors in any maritime dispute.

China prefers to conduct only bilateral negotiations with its regional neighbors. To be most effective, interested nations should resist such lopsided negotiations and act only multilaterally. However, some countries with strong economic ties to China oppose adoption of a legally binding code of conduct, and as a result have prevented ASEAN member states from acting together.¹³

Confusion and uncertainty in the South China Sea work to China's advantage. The government of the Philippines appears to be losing its will to fight in its territorial dispute with China. President Rodrigo Duterte announced on September 13, 2016, that the Philippines would end joint maritime patrols with the United States—to which both parties had agreed previously—in April 2017; thereafter it will allow only aerial patrols, and only within territorial waters.¹⁴ On September 28, 2016, while visiting Vietnam, Duterte stated that the Philippines would hold the U.S.-Philippine bilateral war games—military exercises that China opposes. However, Duterte stated that following the PHIBLEX 33 amphibious exercise,

his government also would reinforce its economic relationships with China and Russia.¹⁵

On the basis of the foregoing, it appears that China has undertaken a cunning strategy designed to wear down its regional neighbors: ignore the PCA ruling (calling it “a political farce staged under legal pretext”—Wang Yi, China’s minister of foreign affairs); reinforce control of the artificial islands and surrounding waters via CCG patrols; use economic leverage (involving, e.g., economic aid and export/import restrictions) over neighboring countries to demand compromise; and squat in the area until disputant nations eventually give up.¹⁶

Compared with Russia, China has executed its ripening-time strategy more slowly and flexibly, taking advantage of having the world’s second-biggest economy and a single-party political system that offers its leadership almost complete autonomy from domestic interference in its foreign and defense policy making. If China had taken actions in the South China Sea as clear and aggressive as those of Russia in Crimea, nearby nations would have reacted strongly. Instead, to avoid fueling its neighbors’ suspicions, China took its time testing the waters to see how the international community would react to its slow but continual transgressions. Indeed, China has taken further advantage of the power vacuum in the region caused by America’s continued preoccupation in the Middle East. Applying its vast resources to marine construction projects, China made such significant territorial changes over such a short period that it is now impossible to revert to the status quo ante. At this point, China need only wait patiently until the nations involved give in and compromise.

THE NEW SECURITY ENVIRONMENT: THE SPACE DIMENSION

While it waits for a situation to ripen, it is important for a revisionist power to restrict the other parties’ ability to seek restitution, and instead to extract concessions.

Modern history offers Nazi Germany’s accession of the Sudetenland from Czechoslovakia as an example of effectively drawing out concessions from an opposing party. As part of its “salami slicing” of eastern Europe, Nazi Germany at the 1938 Munich Conference demanded that other countries, principally the United Kingdom and France, allow the cession of the Sudetenland, justified by the presence of the many ethnic Germans living in that area. The appeasers acceded to this demand in exchange for a guarantee that Germany would settle for these new boundaries and not go to war. The people of western Europe, still weary from World War I and remembering how difficult it had been to de-escalate tensions once mobilization plans were initiated in August of 1914, sought to avoid war at all costs.

In other words, there was no temporal or spatial redundancy in either political or military affairs. Public opinion influenced and pressured politicians' decision-making processes, to the detriment of more-sound military advice.

These days, the development of truly global information-communications technologies means the mass media report incidents that happen on the other side of the world as if they occurred next door. Economically, the world is much more mutually interdependent than during Hitler's day; in this way, political as well as economic relationships among nations are intimate. As a result, should war break out, there is much less spatial redundancy than in the past. If an unforeseen armed conflict occurs between China and Japan (the countries with the world's second- and third-largest economies, respectively) the effect on the world economy and international affairs would be devastating—even if the war zone were limited geographically.

In a strategic environment such as this, revisionist powers have taken the initiative—China and Russia already have crossed the line. By contrast, status quo powers tend to be psychologically suppressed, desiring to avoid retaliating with military force or even exercising a police function. Revisionists, by their willingness to take the initiative at any time, can manipulate the rate by which they increase their governmental presence, encouraging status quo states to conclude that a forceful response is not necessary. Then revisionists can expand their military operations in the area slowly, increasing the tempo gradually, such as by adding air operations to sea operations, or vice versa.

Human senses have thresholds. For example, when exposed to loud noise, your hearing gradually becomes immune; and if continuously pricked with a needle, eventually you feel no pain. The threshold for enduring pain rises as time goes by. Similarly, if revisionist actions are repeated and expanded with some subtlety, the mass media and the international community will accept such actions as the new norm, unless the status quo powers take some kind of sudden, unexpectedly aggressive action.

When revisionist powers practice salami tactics skillfully in peacetime, it imperceptibly raises the pain threshold. If defenders of the status quo take no action in the face of graduated, repetitive aggression, it suggests acceptance of a new stasis. One act of appeasement will lead to another. For defenders of the status quo, how to put a stop to the cycle of appeasement is a crucial challenge.

SOLUTIONS TO THE NEW SPACE AND TIME

As a useful example for understanding space and time in the new security environment, consider NATO's response to Russia.

Altering the Space Dimension

To increase their security in the face of salami tactics, small and medium-sized powers have only two choices: appeasement or collective security through bilateral or multilateral alliances. Alliances bolster deterrence by creating closer relationships among the threatened states, thereby making the space “denser.” During the Cold War, NATO and the neutral states of northern Europe recognized this reality and reacted effectively to Russian aggression in the region.

In 1994, the United Kingdom, the United States, Russia, and Ukraine signed the Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances, under which Ukraine gave up its nuclear weapons. In exchange, the signatories promised that they would not use force against the territorial integrity or political independence of Ukraine.¹⁷ However, twenty years later, Russia invaded Ukraine and annexed the Crimean Peninsula, then muscled in on the Donets region of eastern Ukraine, both enclaves of Russian speakers with historic and cultural links to Moscow. Fighting continues today between the forces of the Ukrainian government and the rebel armed forces—another revisionist effort initiated by a power out to challenge the status quo in defiance of international law.¹⁸

NATO condemned Russia’s activities as an attempt to destabilize eastern Ukraine and a violation of international law. NATO and its member states repeatedly called on Russia to withdraw from Crimea and fulfill its obligations under international law.¹⁹ NATO held a summit in Warsaw in July 2016 and issued a communiqué that branded a wide variety of Russian activities destabilizing to the European security environment. The cited actions included the ongoing illegal and illegitimate annexation of Crimea; the violation of sovereign borders by force; the deliberate destabilization of eastern Ukraine; and large-scale exercises and other provocative military activities near NATO borders, including in the Baltic and Black Sea regions and the eastern Mediterranean.²⁰

Although historically Sweden’s foreign policy has opposed participation in military alliances in general, the Swedish government made clear in 2009 that it supported multinational security and cooperation. It enthusiastically promoted security cooperation and interactions with other countries through international institutions, including the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe. After Russia’s annexation of Crimea, Sweden, although not a member of NATO, reinforced its relations with the organization by signing the memorandum of understanding (MOU) regarding host-nation support. Sweden also is building bilateral, multilayered, cooperative security relationships with other countries.²¹ On June 8, 2016, Sweden’s minister of defense, Peter Hultqvist, signed a letter of intent with his American counterpart, Ashton Carter, to enhance defense cooperation. This followed an earlier defense-cooperation understanding with the

United Kingdom in 2014. While there is no mutual defense obligation between Sweden and the United States, their MOU laid out five key aims: enhancing interoperability, strengthening capabilities and posture through training and exercises, deepening armament cooperation, advancing cooperation in research and development, and meeting common challenges in multinational operations.²²

Finland's foreign and defense policies are similar to Sweden's in many ways, but there are some differences. After Finland became independent from Russia in 1917, it attempted to maintain a good relationship with the Soviet Union, a country with which it shares a long, troubled border. Finland remained more neutral militarily than Sweden (i.e., less Westward tilting). For example, the Agreement of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance, signed in 1948, was canceled in 1992 after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, but Finland replaced it with a basic treaty with Russia. Then, after Finland joined the EU in 1995, it changed its policy to "military non-alignment, backed up by a credible national defense." After Russia annexed Crimea, Finland, also a nonmember of NATO, enhanced its relationship with the organization by signing the MOU regarding host-nation support in 2014.²³ On July 9, 2016, in connection with NATO's Warsaw summit, Finnish defense minister Jussi Niinistö and his British counterpart, Michael Fallon, signed a declaratory expression of intent between their countries.²⁴ The document does not obligate Finland or Britain to provide mutual assistance in the event of a crisis, but rather sets a framework for cooperation.²⁵ A short time later, on August 22, Niinistö told Reuters that Finland also was negotiating a defense-collaboration agreement with the United States.²⁶

Motivating these changes in the foreign policies of Sweden and Finland, including the rapid enhancement of their relationships with NATO, the United States, and the United Kingdom, are Russia's illegal annexation of Crimea, the continuing "hybrid warfare" being practiced in eastern Ukraine, and the growing military competition between NATO and Russia in and around the Baltic Sea.

Altering the Time Dimension

Deterrence also can be reinforced by improving military readiness with regard to time. The following discussion continues to consider the example of northern Europe, where NATO has placed combat troops in the Baltic countries and Poland, each of which shares a border with Russia.

The histories of all four of these countries provided grounds for profound suspicion of Russia; in particular, Poland has been partitioned many times over the centuries. After the Cold War, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and Romania did try to maintain good relationships with their large eastern neighbor, but for reasons of national security they also took steps to enhance their relationships with NATO and the EU. They joined NATO to avail themselves of the principle of collective

self-defense.²⁷ After the Russian annexation of Crimea in the name of protecting Russians, it is not surprising that these countries requested that NATO station troops on their territories. Latvia is particularly vulnerable, as 40 percent of its population is Russian speaking; Estonia's equivalent proportion is 30 percent. Poland shares a border with Ukraine. It is easy to understand why these countries are particularly fearful of what Russia might do.

At the same July 2016 Warsaw summit, NATO welcomed the offers of Canada, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States to serve as framework nations for a robust, multinational forward presence. Beginning in early 2017, that enhanced forward presence was to rest on four battalion-sized battle groups introduced into Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland, provided by framework nations and other contributing allies.²⁸ To enhance its presence in its southern area, such as Romania, NATO further decided to improve integrated training.²⁹ However, establishing a forward allied military presence is not a sufficient deterrent.

In a discussion focused on China's antiaccess/area-denial strategy, Aaron L. Friedberg invokes a more general principle: that the most difficult question confronting U.S. military planners is not what kind of military power they should use, but how aggressively American military power should be used *in an opponent's land*. At a critical moment, if the opponent discerns that the United States has neither the intention nor the ability to employ its military power on the opponent's territory, the leader of that opposing country will not fear retaliation and will underestimate the risk of war that an attack will cause; he will devote more resources toward mounting an offense than to maintaining a defense.³⁰

Applying Friedberg's logic to the future of eastern Europe, if Russia believes NATO has no specific response plan and is not ready to retaliate out of concern for Russian escalation, there is little to deter Russia from continuing its salami tactics. The main purpose of positioning NATO troops in the Baltic countries is to deter Russia's next action.³¹ Will NATO's forces counterattack against Russia, despite the risk of escalation? The answer to this question is at the core of NATO's existence.

Space and Time

These two responses to the new security environment—making space more dense and speeding up the readiness timetable—are intended to prevent additional applications of salami tactics by China and Russia. Where a situation seems to have reached the last stage of a ripening-time strategy (i.e., the revision is almost completed), is there any way to recover?

Russia's action in Crimea is clearly illegal, but as a permanent member of the UN Security Council (UNSC) Russia can veto any UNSC resolution. Russia also has more military power than Ukraine, including nuclear weapons. It would

be difficult for Ukraine to recover its illegally occupied territory anytime soon. Ukraine's only viable strategy is to maintain its citizens' will, thereby preventing the situation from "ripening" any further. It must continue patiently to negotiate within a multinational environment, understanding that any favorable resolution will take significant time.

The best global strategy to prevent larger powers from intimidating weaker ones into making concessions is to never accept any change to the status quo and never confer legitimacy on the illegal use of force. The status quo ante must be maintained. To avoid giving revisionist powers even the smallest opportunity to undermine stability, small and medium-sized nations also should take proactive measures, such as reinforcing alliances and creating favorable international public opinion. Deterrence also can be improved by enhancing collaborative relationships with other nations in areas for which no collective-defense system like NATO exists.

Whether applied reactively or proactively, the basic concepts discussed in this article should be understood and employed dynamically. Static military measures meant to maintain a status quo are meaningless. States need the capability to respond to peacetime salami tactics by revisionist powers to a degree calibrated not to cross the threshold of excessive force. To do so, it is important to have available and to deploy, at the right time and in the right way, both a dynamic police force and such military power as will enable a country to deter or respond to the situation.

Globally, military conflict is expanding. Small and medium-sized states facing intimidation from revisionist powers naturally hesitate to employ military force, even in their own defense. But in the new security environment, in which revisionist powers ingeniously adjust and rebalance the status quo, states must plan for an opponent's initiatives, maintain the ability to act, and be sure of the political will to use force in a crisis, despite the risks of escalation. Above all, the key to calming a crisis before it escalates is to return to the original state of affairs before the revisionist power enters the waiting-game phase of a ripening-time strategy.

The Japan Coast Guard (JCG) has dispatched its patrol ships and aircraft into the sea and air areas around the Senkaku Islands. This helps to maintain security and reinforces the effectiveness of JMSDF surveillance activities in the sea and air domains. Even now, four years after property rights to the Senkaku Islands were transferred from private parties to the Japanese government, the mass media's interest in East China Sea affairs remains high, and they continue to broadcast JCG reports on the activities of Chinese vessels in the waters near the Senkakus. Japanese citizens maintain high awareness of the current situation, and their interest in the Senkaku Islands ensures the government will protect the islands and

Japanese citizens. Japan's response stance is at the threshold level. Mass-media contributions such as these undoubtedly play a significant role in shaping public attitudes, which helps prevent China from unilaterally altering current conditions as part of a ripening-time strategy.

This article has analyzed the security-environment dimensions of time and space, from the perspective of status quo-maintaining nations. The discussion should provide readers with some ideas bearing on Japan's maritime self-defense strategy and its future national security with regard to China. More generally, the article illustrates that the current security challenges vis-à-vis revisionist states such as Russia and China are complex; any attempt to address changes in the status quo is complicated by the many actions and calculations of different parties. Such a situation cannot be explained using military rationales alone, and must be addressed using a multilateral approach that employs all the instruments of power.

NOTES

- The original Japanese version of this article appeared in *Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force Command and Staff College Review* 12, special issue (November 2016). The epigraph comes from 司馬遷 [Sima Qian], trans. Tamaki Ogawa, Makoto Imataka, and Yoshihiko Fukushima, 蘇秦列伝『史記列伝(一)』[Records of the Grand Historian, *Biography of Su Qin*] (Tokyo: Iwanamishoten, 1993), p. 12. Su Qin was an influential strategist during the Warring States period of ancient Chinese history. He advocated a "vertical alliance" to deter the strong 秦 (Qin) kingdom's expansion toward and invasion of the Six Kingdoms on its eastern border. To weaken the Vertical Alliance, the Qin created some bilateral alliances, constituting the so-called Horizontal Alliance.
1. They are Johnson South Reef, Cuarteron Reef, Gaven Reefs, Hugh/Hughes Reef, Fiery Cross Reef, Subi Reef, and Mischief Reef. Airports have been constructed or are under construction on Fiery Cross Reef, Subi Reef, and Mischief Reef. Japan Ministry of Defense, *Defense of Japan 2016* (Tokyo: 2016), p. 57.
 2. 中国, 「人工島」の滑走路で試験飛行ベトナムが抗議 ["China Conducted Test Flight at 'Artificial Island,' Vietnam Protested"], *Asahi Shimbun*, January 4, 2016.
 3. Offshore civil engineering work (e.g., dredging, bank protection): about ¥99.2 billion; onshore construction (e.g., site preparation, building power plants): about ¥5.3 billion; airport-related construction (e.g., concrete pavement, lights installation, power plant installation): about ¥3.8 billion; total: about ¥108.3 billion. ¥108.3 billion × 220 percent (applying a remote island-construction index to the 1,200 km from Hainan Island) = about ¥238.3 billion. The calculation excludes on-shore facilities (e.g., office buildings, barracks, tower, hangars, fuel tanks).
 4. For an example, see Group of Seven Foreign Ministers' Meeting, "G7 Foreign Ministers' Statement on Maritime Security, April 11, 2016, Hiroshima, Japan," available at www.mofa.go.jp/.
 5. Japan Coast Guard, 平成 28 年 8 月上旬の中国公船及び中国漁船の活動状況について ["Activity of Chinese Fishing Boat and Chinese Government Ships in the Early Part of August 2016"], *Japan Coast Guard*, www.kaiho.mlit.go.jp/.
 6. Yōnosuke Nagai, *Jikan no Seijigaku* [Politics and Time] (Tokyo: Chūō Kōronsha, 1979), p. 60 [emphasis added].
 7. *Ibid.*, pp. 62–65.

8. Ibid., p. 80.
9. Japan Ministry of Defense, *Defense of Japan 2016*, p. 71.
10. According to the Pew Research Center, roughly eight in ten Russians (83 percent) say they have confidence in President Putin to do the right thing in world affairs, and roughly nine in ten (89 percent) think the Ukrainian government in Kiev should recognize the results and allow Crimea to join Russia. "Chapter 3. Russia: Public Backs Putin, Crimea's Secession," *Pew Research Center*, May 8, 2014, www.pewglobal.org/.
11. The three biggest reefs are Mischief, Hugh/Hughes, and Johnson Reefs.
12. "China's Activities in the South China Sea," [Japan] Ministry of Defense, December 22, 2015, www.mod.go.jp/. Also see Lyle J. Morris, "Blunt Defenders of Sovereignty: The Rise of Coast Guards in East and Southeast Asia," *Naval War College Review* 70, no. 2 (Spring 2017), pp. 75–112.
13. Thailand, Laos, and Myanmar have sought to avoid expressing a position regarding the South China Sea; Cambodia repeatedly has expressed its active support for China's position. The National Institute for Defense Studies Japan, *East Asian Strategic Review 2016* (Tokyo: May 2016), pp. 152–53.
14. "Do Not Co-patrol with the US Military—Consideration to China in the South China Sea—President of Philippines," *Jijitsushin Sha*, September 13, 2016, www.jiji.com/.
15. "Duterte: 2016 PH-US Military Exercises Will Be the Last," *ABS-CBN News*, September 28, 2016, news.abs-cbn.com/.
16. "Remarks by Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi on the Award of the So-Called Arbitral Tribunal in the South China Sea Arbitration," *Foreign Ministry of the People's Republic of China*, July 12, 2016, www.fmprc.gov.cn/.
17. Permanent Reps. of the Russian Federation, Ukraine, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America to the UN, Letter dated 7 December 1994 from the Permanent Representatives of the Russian Federation, Ukraine, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, UN Doc. A/49/765, S/1994/1399, Annex I (Dec. 19, 1994).
18. "Basic Data of Ukraine," *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan*, www.mofa.go.jp/.
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